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LIVING IN FEAR: RECOVERING NEGLIGENT
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
DAMAGES BASED ON THE FEAR OF
CONTRACTING AIDS
Jill Trachtenberg"

INTRODUCTION
Acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) has afflicted millions of
Americans since 1981. To date, no known cure exists for AIDS, and the
syndrome is considered to be 100 percent fatal.' In 1989, the first law suit
claiming "AIDS phobia" was brought in the United States.' At this time,
millions of Americans, fearing they had come in contact with the disease,
rushed to be tested for the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), which
indicated whether a person would eventually develop AIDS. The test for
HJV was considered to be highly accurate.3 Additionally, the uncertainty
surrounding the modes of transmission of AIDS 4 frightened millions of
Americans. The result of such fear was the use of the court system to
handle cases of frightened individuals who mistakenly thought they had
been exposed to HIV. 5 As the number of HIV infected individuals rose,
'Attorney, Horizon Blue CrossfBlue Shield of New Jersey. B.A., Tulane University,

1991; J.D., Albany Law School of Union University, 1994.
'North Shore Univ. Hosp. v. Rosa, 1995 N.Y. LEXIS 3553, at *I (CL App. Oct. 24, 1995).
'Hare v. State, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
'Brown v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 624 N.Y.S.2d 768 ( Sup, Ct. 1995).

It should be noted the test for HIV has become more accurate in the past few years. Sce TiEchler
v. Dimenna, 609 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1005 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1994) (stating the Enzymc-Linked

Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA) test and the Western Bloc test, taken together are considered
99.9% accurate).
4
AIDS can only be transmitted through certain kinds of contact: direct blood to blood

contact, such as through shared needles of intravenous drug users or through blood transfusions,
or unprotected sexual contact via vaginal or seminal fluids.
'An example of the fear present among many individuals was the influx of lawsuts by
individuals who were bitten by other individuals, even though the "biters" were not infected vath
HIV. See Hare,570 N.Y.S.2d at 126.

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW[

[Vol. 2:529

litigation surrounding HIV exposure or even potential exposure rose as
well.6 While lawsuits based on a fear of disease are not new,7 AIDS and
HIV exposure challenged the legal system to address a disease that is
incurable and fatal.
In the last decade, more than one dozen cases have been brought in
the United States claiming negligent infliction of emotional distress as a
result of coming in contact with AIDS; in many cases, this contract
occurred via a hypodermic needle or syringe. In New York alone, eight
cases alleging this claim have been brought since 1989. The first of these
claims occurred in 1991.8 In the following discussion, state cases in New
York as well as other jurisdictions will be analyzed and compared by
looking at how the courts have treated individuals who have been actually
exposed to HIV, versus individuals who feared exposure to HIV even
though that fear turned out to be unfounded. Additionally, the claim of
negligent infliction of emotional distress will be examined in its
traditional role, as well as the part it now plays in cases involving AIDS
and HIV.
NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Negligent infliction of emotional distress has been alleged as a cause of
action for decades. In 1961, New York courts first allowed the negligent
infliction of emotional distress claim as a separate tort action. 9 Courts
were reluctant to allow such a claim to stand on its own for two reasons:
first, that a flood of litigation would ensue, and second, that proving the
nature of the injury or injuries would be difficult. 1 The counter-argument
to these concerns was that the system should not preclude a legitimate
claim."
Therefore, although the concept of negligent infliction of

6

Michael Hoenig, HIV andAIDS Related Issues, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8, 1993, at 3. In July of

1992, the Journal of the American Medical Association and the New York Times reported that
projections for 1995 estimated more than two million HIV infected adults and AIDS sufferers in
the United States. Id.
'Ferrera v. Galluchio, 152 N.E.2d 249 (N.Y. 1958) (allowing recovery for fear of disease).
'See Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 558 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
"See Battala v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729 (N.Y. 1961).
'°See id. at 729-32.
"Ferrera,152 N.E.2d at 252 (stating "it is entirely possible to allow recovery only upon
satisfactory evidence and deny it when there is nothing to corroborate the claim").
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emotional distress was eventually adopted, the scope of the claim has
taken on several different forms and has been greatly expanded since its
inception. Three major transformations have occurred:
(1) recovery for the fear of disease when an actual injury occurred; 2
(2) recovery in the absence of an injury to the claimant
(this includes the zone of danger rule and the bystander rule); 3 and
(3) recovery for the fear of disease, even in the absence of
an injury, assuming the claim was genuine.' 4
Actual Injury
In 1958, the New York Court of Appeals, in Ferrarav. Galluchio,
sustained a negligence claim based on the fear of disease.' 5 Thejury had
rendered averdict for $25,000 including $15,000 formental anguish, even
though the plaintiff had only brought a claim for medical malpractice. 6
The facts of this landmark case are quite simple.17 Plaintiffreceived x-ray
treatment for bursitis of her right shoulder, and as a result of the treatment
suffered bums." Plaintiff was also informed the affected area might
become cancerous.' 9 Thus, plaintiff sustained an actual injury for which
she was compensated.2" However, every six months following the
treatment, plaintiff was required to have her shoulder examined for
cancerous evidence.2 ' The court found "[t]here was a real connection
between the ultimate damage and the original wrong."' 2 In later cases,
this connection was termed "genuineness."2' The court went on to state
that each individual living within New York had a right to be free from
mental disturbance.24 This case firmly established that negligent infliction
of emotional distress claims based upon the fear of disease could be
successful, provided an actual injury existed.
12

Ferrera v. Galluchio, 152 N.E.2d 249, 251-52 (N.Y. 1958).
See Bovsun v. Sanperi, 461 N.E.2d 848 (N.Y. 1984).

3

"See Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 695, 697 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
'5Ferrera,152 N.E.2d at 250.
"Id at 251.
1
Ferrera v. Galluchio, 152 N.E.2d 249 (N.Y. 1958)
1
'Id. at 250.
9Id. at 251.
20
21Id.
1d.
2Ferrera v. Galluchio, 152 N.E.2d 249, 251 (N.Y. 1958).
"Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 695, 697 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991).
24
Ferrera,152 N.E.2d at 252.
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Absence of Injury
Tort law has greatly expanded since Ferrera was decided. While
negligent infliction of emotional distress once required an actual injury to
the plaintiff, tort law gradually expanded to allow uninjured third parties
to bring negligence claims. This occurred through a zone of danger rule,
which allowed an individual to recover based upon his proximity to the
accident or injury;25 and through a limited bystander recovery rule, which
allowed recovery for individuals who witnessed the death or serious injury
of a family member.26
Zone of Danger
The zone of danger rule allows an individual who is threatened with
bodily harm by the defendant's conduct to recover for emotional distress
stemming from viewing the death or injury of a family member.27 The
plaintiff cannot be a mere observer or witness, but rather a participant in
the event which caused the danger. Additionally, there must be a special
relationship to the defendant.28 This rule of recovery was adopted by
many jurisdictions and the Restatement of Torts Second, 29 and therefore,
gradually became the majority rule nationwide.
Based on the zone of danger theory, the plaintiff must not only
witness the harm of a family member, but the plaintiff must also be within
the "zone of danger" herself.30 In Dillon v. Legg, a mother and sister
witnessed a car collision with a young boy, resulting in his death.3 The
Supreme Court of California dismissed the mother's claim because she
was not within the zone of danger; however, the sister's claim was
sustained, as she was closer to the accident and may have "feared for her
own safety., 32 While New York does not allow for this type of recovery,
several jurisdictions, including California, permit recovery, even when the
plaintiff is not within the zone of danger.33 California, as well as several

'See Battala v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729 (N.Y. 1961).
26
See Bovsun v. Sanperi, 461 N.E.2d 843 (N.Y. 1984).
27
See Bovsun, 461 N.E.2d at 847.
28
See Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 422 (N.Y. 1969).
29
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 App.(1966).
3'Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
3id. at 914.
'21d. at 915.
3Id. (allowing for recovery based on foreseeability).
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other jurisdictions, has allowed recovery based on forseeability. 4 These
jurisdictions have adopted the rule set forth by the California Supreme
Court in Dillon, which states "[t]hat damages may be recovered for the
emotional trauma caused when a plaintiffwitnesses the injury or death of
a close relative even though the plaintiff himself is not within the zone of
danger . . . , provided that the emotional injury is reasonably
foreseeable." 3'
BYSTANDER RECOVERY
As a general rule, bystanders cannot recover damages for the negligent
infliction of emotional distress in New York state; however, a limited
exception to this rule does exist.36 In 1984, New York carved an
exception from the zone of danger rule to include bystander recovery.37
The rule was expanded to allow "one who is himself or herself threatened
with bodily harm in consequence ofthe defendant's negligence to recover
based on emotional distress resulting from viewing the death or serious
' The comments to
injury of a member of his or her immediate family."33
section 436 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts support this limited
exception. The Restatement states that if the negligence of an individual
threatens bodily harm to another, and affects that individual's emotional
well being, the defendant is subject to liability if the person actually
39
injured is a member of the plaintiffs immediate family.
This exception was first used in New York in Bovsun v. Sanperi"
This case marked a significant deviation from the long-standing rule
barring bystander recovery. As a result of Bovsun, New York allowed for
bystander recovery limited to those persons who were within the zone of
danger4 New York did not extend recovery to individuals based on
foreseeability as California did in Dillon v. Legg.42 Therefore, New York
' 4See Bovsun v. Sanperi, 462 N.E.2d 843, 846 n.4 (N.Y. 1984) (listing Hawaii, Iowa,
Massachusetts, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Texas).
35
Id. at 846 (citing Dillon, 441 P.2d at 920).
"Trombetta v. Conkling, 626 N.E.2d 653 (N.Y. CL App. 1993).
337Bovsuni, 461 N.E.2d at 843.
S1d. at 847.
39
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 436 cmt. f (1965).
4
Bovsun, 461 N.E.2d at 843.
4
14d.
"2Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
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continued to view bystander recovery as an exception to the general rule
prohibiting such recovery.
In Bovsun, a family vehicle was on the shoulder of a highway.43 The
father was behind the vehicle when the vehicle was struck in the rear. 4
The family, who was in the car and did not actually witness the accident,
became immediately aware of what had occurred. 45 Recovery damages
were allowed, as the family was deemed within the zone of danger.46
Under the Bovsun rule, the family members did not actually have to
witness the accident, as long as the family members were immediately
aware of the victim's injuries and observed the victim immediately after
the accident.47
The bystander recovery rule may only apply to immediate family
members, and furthermore, the courts have narrowly construed the
definition of "immediate family." 48 In Trombetta v. Conkling, plaintiff
witnessed the death of her aunt by a tractor-trailer.49 Plaintiff did not live
with her aunt.50 The New York State Court of Appeals held the plaintiff
was not entitled to recover based on this relationship, establishing a bright
line rule to prevent fictitious suits brought under a bystander recovery
theory, and the aunt/niece relationship did not meet this bright line test.'
The courts have also limited bystander recovery in situations where
the plaintiff was outside the zone of danger. In Tobin v. Grossman, a
mother brought suit to recover for injury to her child.52 The child was hit
by a car outside the family home.53 While the mother did not actually
witness the accident, she heard the brakes of the vehicle screech to a halt,
and looked outside to find her child lying on the ground. 4 The Court of
Appeals did not allow recovery for emotional distress because the mother
herself was not within the zone of danger.55 This case clearly

43

Bovsun v. Sanperi, 461 N.E.2d 843, 44 (1984).

4Id.

4Sld.

46Id. at 845.
47

1d

"Trombetta v. Conkling, 626 N.E.2d 653, 655 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1993).

49Id.
5
od.
5

lid.
Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1969).
S3Id. at 420.
52

S4Id.

'SId.at 419.
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demonstrates the difference between New York's and California's
recovery rules. Had Tobin occurred in California, the mother might have
recovered based on a foreseeability standard. However, New York does
not allow for this means of recovery based on foreseeability.
GENUINENESS OF THE CLAIM
The final element crucial to sustaining a negligent infliction of emotional
distress cause of action is the "genuineness of the claim. 5 6 Satisfaction
of this element was crucial for AIDS phobia claims to survive thejudicial
process. In 1989, the first AIDS phobia case was brought in New York.57
Two years later, in 1991, a New York court allowed recovery for a
negligence cause of action in Castro v. New York Life Insurance
Company. 8 The court permitted the claim to stand because it could be
tied to a distinct event which would cause a reasonable person to develop
a fear of contracting the disease. 9 This link between the event and the
fear was referred to as the "genuineness of the claim," and this link
indicated the claim was legitimate.
AIDS PHOBIA IN NEW YORK
New York follows the majority rule regarding recovery in AIDS phobia
cases, which requires a showing of actual exposure to IRV or AIDS.") A
minority view, which has only been adopted by two states,6' allows
recovery based upon a general reasonableness standard.
Castrov. New York Life InsuranceCompany was the first Nev York
case sustained on AIDS phobia grounds; however, it was not the first case
brought based on contracting HIV. 62 Cases based on individuals who
contracted the virus from other individuals, blood transfusions, or
contaminated needles had been litigated since the mid 1980's, when AIDS
was confirmed to be a communicable, and fatal disease. At that time,
"'See Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 695, 697 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
'Hare v. State, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
"Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
59
1d at 698.
6
6

See infra, p. 545-58, for a discussion of the majority rule.

Currently, only Maryland and New Jersey have adopted this view. Sce Faya v. Almarez,
620 A.2d 327 (Md. Ct. App. 1993); Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14 (N.J. 1997).
62Castro, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 695; See Hare v. State, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125 (Sup. Ct. 1991).

536
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most of the litigation was aimed at blood banks that had distributed
infected blood to hospitals for blood transfusions. 63 During the early years
of the AIDS epidemic, blood banks had not implemented testing
procedures for IliV. 64 In cases ofblood transfusion negligence claims, the
plaintiffs had direct, identifiable physical injuries. Claims for AIDS
phobia differ from these older and somewhat traditional claims because
an injury is not required.
Prior to Castro,one New York case alleged negligent infliction of
emotional distress based on exposure to HIV (AIDS phobia). 5 In Hare
v. State, plaintiff, a hospital employee, was injured when a hospitalized
prison inmate bit him.66 Although plaintiff was awarded $35,000.00, this
award was for pain, suffering, medical expenses and loss of earnings, not
for the fear of developing the AIDS virus. 67 The plaintiff was unable to
recover for several reasons:
(1) the claim was too speculative to award damages;
(2) plaintiff provided no proof that the inmate who bit
plaintiff had the AIDS virus (actual exposure standard
was not met); and
(3) plaintiff did not show proximate cause. 8
In order for a claimant to recover for AIDS phobia, he must show the
emotional distress was directly caused by the negligence of the defendant.
Additionally, the claimant must prove that the breach was the proximate
cause of the defendant's negligence.69 While the plaintiff lost weight and
suffered cold symptoms, the court held he had not suffered an injury as he
continued to test negative for AIDS.70
Castro v. New York Life Insurance Company was the second case
brought within the New York State court system. 71 In Castro, the New
York State Supreme Court, New York County stated:

63

See Roth v. New York Blood Ctr., 569 N.Y.S.2d 639 (Sup. Ct. 1993).

6"See

id.

SSeveral federal cases alleging AIDS phobia were brought prior to this time.
"Hare
v. State, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125, 126 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
67
1d.
6
1d. at 126-27.
6"Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside Med. Ctr., 512 N.E.2d 538 (N.Y. 1987).
7°Hare, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 127.
71Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 695, 695 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
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[i]t must be proven that the condition suffered is a direct result
of defendant's breach of duty, and that the breach was a
proximate cause of injuries. Prospective consequences must be
expected to flow with reasonable certainty from the harm, and
if the claim can be tied to a distinct event which could cause a
reasonable persons to develop a fear of contracting AIDS, there
is a genuineness to the claim?2
In Castro,plaintiffbrought a personal injury case, claiming that while she
was working as a cleaning person, she was stuck in the thumb with a
discarded syringe needle.' In her complaint, she alleged the needle could
have been contaminated with IRV, and therefore she may have been
exposed to the virus. 74 The plaintiff presented the medical records of her
psychiatrist as extensive proof of the emotional injury she suffered
following the incident. 75 The court held that because her claim could be
directly tied to a specific event, she had stated a legitimate claim.76
However, because no proof existed of actual exposure to the HIV, the case
has been criticized as being too permissive. 77 However, looking back at
this decision, it may not have been too permissive, but rather the start of
a different kind of thindng about what is considered to be a recoverable
claim for emotional distress.
Following Castro, Ordwav v. County of Suffolk was brought in
1992.78 In Ordway, a physician brought suit claiming negligent infliction
of emotional distress based on the fear of contracting HIV after
performing a surgical procedure on an arrestee who had been brought into
the hospital. 79 The physician was unaware of the patient's HIV positive
status.80 The court stated that performing procedures on an individual
brought to the hospital by a third party (a police officer) and being
unaware of the lIV status of the patient is insufficient as a matter of law

"'Id.
at 696 (citing Hare v. State, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125 (Sup. CL 1991)).
73Castro, 58S N.Y.S.2d at 696.
74Id.

761d.

"Tischlerv. Dimmena, 609 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1007 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (stating that vhule aprecipitating incident existed in Castro, there was no hint of exposure, -whichindicates that Ca-tro
should be limited to its unique facts).
"Ordway v. County of Suffolk, 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (Sup. CL 1992).
7-Id.

'OId. at 1015.
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to sustain a claim."' There was no indication of legitimacy (genuineness)
required when no injury resulted from the incident or exposure. 2 There
83
was also no loss of income as a result of his exposure to the virus.
Finally, there was no indication that the treatment offered in this case
would have been altered in any way as a result of disclosure of the
patient's HIV positive status.
To bring a law suit for negligence, it must be shown that there was a
duty and a breach of this duty. However, in Ordway, neither the patient,
nor the county, was under a duty to disclose the patient's HIV status to the
84
physician under Article 27-F of the New York State Public Health Law.
This law was enacted in response to the New York legislature's
recognition of a need for maximum confidentiality of HIV related
information. To carry out this intent, regulations were effectuated which
prohibited the disclosure of HIV-related information solely to carry out
"infection control precautions." 5 Therefore, because the defendant had no
duty to disclose the patient's HIV status under New York law, the
physician was unable to meet the required elements of a negligence claim,
and his cause of action was dismissed.
In Tischler v. Dimenna, the defendant had a duty to inform the
plaintiff of the defendant's HIV status. The plaintiff had engaged in
intercourse with the defendant, who was H1V positive.8 7 The plaintiffwas
not aware of defendant's HIV status.8 8 The court stated that the
defendant's duty to inform the plaintiff arose when he knew or should
have known he had a communicable disease. 9 Additionally, the defendant
had a duty not to intentionally or negligently inflict mental distress upon
the plaintiff.9" The court further stated the "plaintiff has proven probable
exposure to the disease."'" This perhaps was the first time a New York

81id .

"Id. (The facts indicate that there was no broken glove, pierced skin or bite mark and the
physician never tested positive for HIV. Therefore, he sustained no injury.)
"Ordway v. County of Suffolk, 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1015 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
4N.Y. PuB. HEALTH § 2782 (McKinney 1992).
SOrdway, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 1014 (citing N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS tit. 10, § 63.5
(1992)).
Tischler v. Dimenna, 609 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1009 (Sup. Ct. 1994).
87Id.

88.d.

'91d. at 1004.
9Id.

9'Tischler v. Dimenna, N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1009 (Sup. Ct. 1994).
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court deviated from an actual exposure standard. The court then stated
"the issue of reasonableness of the plaintiff s fear and for what period of
time that fear is compensable are questions for the jury after hearing her
testimony and upon a full review of actual medical testimony.""2 This was
a victory and what could be deemed a landmark case in New York, in that
the court understood the fear of contracting AIDS was inherent in many
individuals. In reaching its conclusion, the court discussed the different
methods for testing for HIV, the effectiveness of such methods, and the
latency period of approximately six months in which a positive result
might not appear, even if the virus was present in a person's body. 93 In
addition, this was the first court in New York to not only recognize a
latency window period, but to propose allowing limited recovery
beginning at the date that exposure to HIV was discovered. 94 Finally, the
court discussed reasonableness, a concept later expanded upon in
Williamson v. Waldman in New Jersey.9" The Tischlerdecision followed
the reasoning set forth in a Pennsylvania case, Lubowitz v. Albert Einstein
Medical Center,96 which was decided one year prior to Tischler.
The Lubowitz decision recognized the AIDS/HIV virus had a latency
period during which an individual who had H1V could test negative.7
This was one of the first courts to acknowledge the existence of a latency
period. However, even after acknowledging this period, the court
apparently did not know what to do with this information, or how to apply
the information to this case. The court proposed granting summary
judgment with leave to sue at a later date if AIDS developed. 3 This
proposal prevented frivolous suits brought by people who tested
negatively forHIV for years. It also avoided awarding monetary damages
based upon an irrational fear, and forced litigants to have a substantial
claim before wasting time and money. However, the Pennsylvania court
failed to realize that the plaintiffs were bringing suit based upon a fear, not
upon an actual injury. Therefore, the court missed the point of the claim
when it dismissed the action pending actual contraction of the disease.

9Id.
9

3Id. at 1002.
9Id.

95Williamson v. Waldman,696 A.2d 14 (N.J. 1997).
'Lubowitz v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 623 A.2d 3 (Pa. Supr. Ct 1993).
97Id.
98 at 4.

1d.
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The crux of AIDS phobia is that it deals specifically with that reasonable
fear of contraction of HIV, not the actual contraction of the disease.
Maryland and New Jersey have since followed up on the Lubowitz
decision. These courts took the information acquired in Lubowitz and
applied it in a logical and consistent manner.99 The courts recognized
there was a six to twelve month latency period in which tests could not
conclusively indicate whether an individual had contracted HIV virus.'
During this time period, the courts concluded, assuming that the fear was
reasonable and could be tied to a specific event, damages should be
awarded for fear of AIDS. These courts recognized that the claim being
brought was for fear of acquiring the disease, and not for actual injury.
However, to date, these two jurisdictions constitute only a minority
viewpoint, and New York has not chosen to adopt this view.
However, there may be some hope for New York. First, as seen in
Tischler,New York courts have begun to recognize that a latency period
does exist for HIV, and courts have even suggested allowing limited
recovery.'0 1 Second, in Brown v. New York City Health & Hospital
Corporation,Justice Lisa attempted to follow up on Tischler.02 In Brown,
Justice Lisa suggested that any damages for AIDS phobia should be
limited to the fear experienced within one year, and a one year statute of
limitations be set on AIDS phobia claims. 13 Additionally, Justice Lisa
noted plaintiffs have a duty to mitigate damages by undergoing HIV
° While it is apparent that New York
testing during the window period.'O
is taking a step in the right direction by recognizing the existence of the
latency period, New York has yet to apply the rules suggested by Justice
Lisa.
In 1994, Kaufman v. Physical Measurements was litigated in New
York.10 5 A postal worker stuck his finger on a hypodermic needle
protruding from a package addressed to a laboratory. 106 Although he tested
negative for HIV on five separate occasions during the course of eighteen

'See discussion, infra pp. 562-65.
"'Seediscussion, infra pp. 562-65.
"'See Tischler v. Dimenna, 609 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1007 (Sup. Ct. 1994).
"'Brown v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 624 N.Y.S.2d 768 (Sup. Ct. 1995).
'Ild at 770.

"'OId at 771; Tischler,609 N.Y.S.2d at 1008 (stating that the plaintiff has a duty to mitigate
damages and should be required to take the HIV test three months after exposure).
"°Kaufmnan, v. Physical Measurements, Inc., 615 N.Y.S.2d 508 (Sup. Ct. 1994).
'°6Id. at

508
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months, the postal worker brought suit claiming negligent infliction of
emotional distress based on the fear on contracting HIV.' °' The court
found there was no genuineness to the claim. 0 3 It was later determined
that the individual whose blood had been extracted did not have HIV.6'9
While New York recognized the existence of a latency period earlier
in the year (Tischler was decided several months prior to Kaufman), the
trial court did not apply the latency period reasoning to Kaufman. Had
this standard been applied, recovery might have been allowed during the
first year only, thus precluding the plaintiff pursuing a cause of action
eighteen months later. However, even after learning that both the plaintiff
and the individual whose blood had been take were both HIV negative, the
court did not dismiss the case. " Instead, the trial court stated the basis of
plaintiff s claim was a documented physical injury, and allowed the claim
to stand."' The New York State Supreme Court later reversed the trial
court, stating "[t]here is no objective medical evidence in this record to
substantiate the concern that Kaufinan has contracted or been exposed to
As cases based on AIDS phobia continued to enter the courts, juries
were asked to put dollar figures on the fear of contracting AIDS. In
Sargeant v. New York Infiriar, Beelaan Downtown Hospital, a jury
initially awarded a Jehovah's witness $500,000 for fear of disease and
mental anguish, caused by a violation of his religious beliefs." 3 Plaintiff
was a Jehovah's witness who was given plasma during the course of
treatment. 1 4 Upon realizing that he was being given a blood product, he
demanded the treatment be discontinued." 5 He made no statement upon
admission indicating he would not accept blood products."'
Approximately six months later, plaintiff brought suit claiming fear of
disease and mental anguish.' '7 At the time of suit, plaintifftested negative
07

1d.

Ie3Id"
.IId.
" Kaufman, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 50S.
11i'd.
"'id.
"3Sargeant v. New York Infirmary Beckman Dow,,rntown Hosp., 635 N,Y.S,2d 8,8 (Sup.
Ct. 1995).
4

1 d. at9.
151d.

6
11
1d.
117Md.

542

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW[

[Vol. 2:529

for both HIV and Hepatitis C." 8 However, the trial court found the19

transfusion constituted a physical invasion and allowed both claims."
The court reasoned that had suit been brought for fear of disease alone,
plaintiff might not have recovered any damages. 120 Justice Freedman, who
presided over the case, expressed strong doubts as to whether the plaintiff
had a viable claim for AIDS phobiaper se, because he had tested negative
for HIV.12 ' The following year
upon appeal, the judgment was reversed
22
dismissed.
was
case
and the

Based upon the nature of this claim, dismissal of the case was the
appropriate decision. In circumstances when the blood that came into
contact with the plaintiff is immediately determined to be HIV negative,
recovery is not warranted. Because no uncertainty exists, the crucial
element of anxiety or "phobia" is absent. Ironically, the New York State
Supreme Court's ruling in Kaufman which required "objective medical
evidence to substantiate a claim" was actually more applicable to
Sargeant,than to Kaufinan. nSargeant,no "objective medical evidence
to substantiate the claim" existed, and yet the trial court allowed the case

to continue.12 3 Had the Kaufman standard been applied in Beekman, this
case would have been properly dismissed at the onset.
The majority trend in AIDS phobia cases is to disallow recovery of
emotional distress damages ifthe plaintiff cannot show actual exposure to
IV and/or it is substantially likely that the plaintiff was not infected with
HIV, and therefore, will not develop AIDS.124 In determining whether to
uphold a claim for AIDS phobia, New York courts have looked at several
factors:

...Sargeant v. New York Infirmary Beekman Downtown Hosp., 635 N.Y.S.2d 8, 9 (Sup.

Ct. 1995).
9

11d.

120Md.
'"Barbara Goldberg, A Different Readingfor 'Sargeant'Ruling, N.Y. L.J. April 7, 1995,
at 2.

123Sargeant v. New York Infirmary Beekman Downtown Hosp., 635 N.Y.S.2d 8, 9 (Sup.

Ct. 1995).
124Arthur Grebow and Paul R. Lees-Haley, FearofFutureIllness, 47 CPCU 449 (1994).
This "more likely than not" test has recently been adopted in California pursuant to Potter v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber, 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993). However, as discussed later, the author does
not believe it is the appropriate test to use in AIDS related cases.
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(1) whether there is proof the defendant has BIV or
AIDS (actual exposure)"~;
(2) the mode of transmission; 16 and
(3) the genuineness of the claim.
Several ofthese factors may overlap.' 27 Additionally, this is a case by case
approach based on a totality of the circumstances analysis.
The first factor examined is whether the defendant had HIV and
whether actual exposure can be demonstrated. Some proof must exist
indicating the defendant had HIV. New York courts infrequently award
damages based on speculation or the mere possibility that an individual
will contract IHV.12 In Hare v. State, one of the reasons the claim was
not sustained was because the plaintiff could not prove he had been
exposed.1 29 Even when a plaintiff has been able to show some exposure,
the claim may be conditionally dismissed. 30 The medical proof must be
sufficient; if the tests for IRV are consistently negative, it is unlikely the
claim will be sustained. Several courts have ordered the plaintiff to
undergo IV testing. While this seems drastic, it is to be expected if an
individual brings an AIDS phobia claim. In Brown v. New York City
Health & Hospital Corporation,the court stated "[b]y commencing a
lawsuit seeking damages for having contracted HIV/AIDS infection, a
plaintiff places her IV status in issue and may not thereafter refuse to
submit to a definitive IHV-antibody test."''
The second factor examines the way in which the virus was allegedly
transmitted. Courts recognize that the transfusion of blood, or biting an
individual, are unlikely modes of transmission. For example, the Hare
case involved plaintiff who was bitten by the defendant. 33' This case was
eventually dismissed. 33 Courts today recognize the method by which
blood is drawn and transfused has been perfected and, therefore, it is an
unlikely mode of HIV transmission. 34 Additionally, it is rare, though not
'2Hare v. State, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125, 126 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
1

27 Id

See Castro v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1991).

'sHare, 57 N.Y.S.2d at 125.
179Id.

"'Tischler
v. Dimmena, 609 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1009 (Sup. Ct. 1994).
13

Brown v. NewYork City Health & Hosp. Corp., 624 N.Y.S.2d 768, 771 (Sup. Ct. 1995).

"'Hare v. State, 57 N.Y.S.2d 125, 125 (Sup. Ct. 1991).

13id. at 127.
"Dr. Szebeny, Addressing the AIDS Law Class on AIDS in the United StateS (Sept. 1995).
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impossible, to contract HIV through biting. Cases involving hypodermic
needles seem to be the most frequently sustained. 135 This is among the
most likely methods of transmitting the disease, as accidentally putting
another individual's blood directly in contact with one's blood is one way
in which HIV is spread.
The third factor examined is the genuineness of the claim. This is an
essential part of the analysis. If the transmission cannot be tied to a
specific event, and there is no genuineness to the claim, the claim will
most likely be dismissed. In other words, merely being exposed to an
individual who has the disease will not suffice to sustain a claim. In Doe
v. Doe, a woman brought suit claiming that her husband had a homosexual
affair, which placed her at risk of contracting HIV. 3 6 There was no proof
that either she or her husband had ever been exposed to the disease. 137 She
was unable to point to any distinct event or any specific point in time
when the exposure might have occurred. 138 Based on a lack of
genuineness, the claim was dismissed.'39
While not specifically outlined in every case, the courts do use this

three factor analysis. A balancing test, encompassing these factors, as well
as others, must be used in every case. As previously discussed,140only one
New York case has awarded damages based on AIDS phobia.
New York has not been very tough on the AIDS phobia cases. Since
1994 (after recognizing the latency period), New York has become tougher
(as evidenced in Kaufman); however, the three factor analysis is not
difficult to satisfy. If an individual who has truly been exposed to HIV
brings a claim, he will not have a difficult time meeting New York's three
part test and making out aprimafaciecase.
While New York single-handedly has the most cases filed claiming
AIDS phobia, several other states have addressed this issue. With the
exception of Maryland and New Jersey, which have adopted the general
reasonableness standard, the analysis in the majority of the states has not

"'SeeCastro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1991); Marchica v.
Long Island R.R., 810 F. Supp. 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
" 6Doe v. Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595, 596 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
137Id
13

Sid.

1391d.
40

t Award of $500,000 Found Excessivefor Transfusion to Jehovah's Witness, N.Y. L.J.,

August 24, 1994, at 21 (Sargeantv. N.Y. Infirmary Beekman Downtown Hospital is an unreported
case which was decided in the Supreme Court of New York County in 1994).
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greatly differed from New York's analysis, which uses the actual exposure
standard.
OTHER JURISDICTIONS
At the same time that Castrowas decided in New York, the West Virginia
Supreme Court was deciding Johnson it West Virginia University
Hospital1 41 In Johnson,plaintiffwas awarded $1.9 million in damages for
being exposed to the AIDS virus. 41 While the analysis was similar to that
used in New York, the award amount was quite different. In Johnson,43a
police officer employed by University Hospital helped subdue apatient1
Although the physicians and hospital workers were aware that the patient
had AIDS, the plaintiff was not informed.'" Contrary to hospital policy,
the hospital failed to tell the officer so he could take certain precautions. 4 s
The patient, who had blood in and around his mouth, bit plaintiff, causing
a break in the skin, which caused the blood of the plaintiff and the patient
to come into contact. 46 As a result of this incident, plaintiff received
psychological counseling due to loss of sleep and appetite and his wife left
him for fear that she might contract
HIV. 14' However, plaintiff
4
'
continuously tested negative for HIV.1
Under a New York analysis, this claim probably would have been
sustained because the three basic elements needed to satisfy the claim
were present. The individual who bit plaintiff had AIDS, the mode of
transmission allowed both individuals' blood to come into contact with
each other (biting is usually not considered a likely mode of transmission
because the virus is infrequently transferred through saliva) and there was
genuineness to the claim. It should be noted the patient bit the plaintiff
in 1988 and this case was not brought until 1990. '4 However, the
minority viewpoint allowing claims to be sustained based upon the six to

...Johnson
v. West Virginia Univ. Hosp., 413 S.E.2d 889 (W, Va, 1991),
'421d. at 891.
43
1 1d.
144Id.
145

1d.

'"Johnson
v. West Virginia Univ. Hosp., 413 S.E.2d 889, 891 (W. Va. 1991)
1471d.
14Id

"

149Id. at 889.
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twelve month latency period did not come into existence until 1993.150 As
this was two years after Johnson was decided, the precedent was not yet
established.
Lubowitz v. Albert Einstein Medical Center was decided in 1993.51
The plaintiffs brought suit claiming the blood used to impregnate Mrs.
Lubowitz through in vitro fertilization tested HIV positive."5 While the
blood did test positive on one occasion, subsequent testing indicated the
first test was a false-positive.1 5 3 The court dismissed the claim because no
compensable injury existed.'54 However, the court did state "[i]f Robyn
Lubowitz eventually were to contract AIDS [as the result of the events
outlined in this case], she would have a cause of action for a compensable
injury at that time."' 5 The court recognized that testing negative on one
or two occasions did not mean the individual would remain free of the
AIDS virus, thereby acknowledging that a latency period existed." 6
However, as the case was brought based on fear of the disease, not actual
contraction of the disease, and the fear could be tied to a specific event
(the false-positive), damages should have been awarded for the six to
twelve month period in which the plaintiffs experienced actual fear. This
one incident was enough to create reasonable fear.
In Kerins v. Hartley, a California court applied an analysis similar to
the one used in past cases and recognized the existence of a window of
anxiety and awarded damages based upon that window. 57 In Kerins,
plaintiffwas operated on by a physician infected with IffV.' At the time
of surgery, the physician thought he might be infected, but had not been
informed of the results of his test. 59 Approximately, two years later, the
physician announced he was HIV positive on a televised news broadcast
seen by plaintiff.160 Plaintiff immediately underwent HIV testing and was
informed two weeks later she was HIV negative.161 The trial court granted
150 d.
...2Lubowitz v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 623 A.2d 3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).

' Id.at 4.
13Id.
IS4Id.

'"Id.at 6.
"SLubowitz v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 623 A.D.2d 3, 6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
's'Kerins v. Hartley, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621, 621-22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
...
at 623.
19Id.
d
"

16Id.
16lid.
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summary judgment for the physician."' The Appellate Court, Division
One, reversed, stating that recovery should be allowed during the "window
of anxiety."163 However, the court recognized the latency period had
expired, and she had only experienced fear for a limited two week
T 6 Plaintiff was not awarded any damages for this period. 16' Less
period.'
than a year later, as a result of the California Supreme Court's ruling in
Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber,166 the California Supreme Court
granted the physician petition to review and transferred the case to the
Appellate Court, Division Two.167 This court reversed the ruling of the
Appellate Court, Division One and reinstated
the trial court's summary
68
physician.
the
of
favor
in
judgment ruling
The Potter case disregarded the analysis of the Appellate Court,
Division One in Kerins. The Pottercourt did not involve an AIDS case
and also did not consider a "window of anxiety" time frame. Potterwas
a tort case that centered on a toxic waste dump and the potential for
contracting cancer as a result of one's proximity to the toxic area.' The
California Supreme Court attempted to compare Potter and Kerins by
discussing various public policy concerns about why a claim of negligent
7
infliction of emotional distress should not be allowed to stand alone.L'
The court at length discussed the affordability of liability insurance for
toxic tort cases and the impact these cases could have upon the health care
field. 71 The result of this analysis was the court imposed a burden on the
plaintiff to demonstrate it was "more likery than not" he would develop
the disease in question in the future."7
The California Supreme Court's treatment ofKerins in light ofPotter
fails to address some significant differences between the facts of the two
cases. First, H.V and cancer are not comparable. If cancer is detected in
its early stages, it may be successfully treated. However, once HIV is
detected, no treatment exists to date that could successfully fight the
"6Kerins v. Hartley, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621, 625 (Cal. Ct App. 1993).
"'Id.at 628.
14Id.

16Id.

VPatter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber, 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993).
"Kerins v. Hartley, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621 (Cal. CL App. 1993).
"'Id. at 633.
'69Potter,863 P.2d at 801.
170Id. at 804.
1721d.
171d.
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outcome of death. Second, because HIV has a "window of anxiety," a
person has a somewhat definitive time frame to learn whether he has
contracted the disease. Current research indicates that this time frame is
between six months and one year. i73 The California Supreme Court's
analysis ignores these differences by failing to treat the medical conditions
differently; cancer and HIV have different tests, different modes of
transmission and different treatments. Additionally, the fear ofdeveloping74
cancer was a starting point for the HIV claims presently being litigated.'
Initially, cancer cases originally recognized that a claim could stand based
upon the fear of contracting a disease. However, over the course of time,
the courts have restricted recovery based on the75 fear of getting cancer, and
newer decisions show no signs of retreating.1
The Appellate Court, Division Two should have affirmed the trial
court's ruling and taken it a step further by allowing damages for the two
week period in which plaintiff experienced fear. Her fear was reasonable
and tied to a specific event, and therefore genuine. The claim should have
allowed damages from the point of discovery, regardless of how minimal
they would have been. The point is that plaintiff did experience
reasonable fear for the two week period and should have been
compensated for it.
Following Kerins, the Arizona Court of Appeals decided
TransAmerica Insurance v. Doe.176 Again, the court failed to recognize
the latency period that the Lubowitz court applied. The court in
TransAmerica required an actual injury, testing positive for the AIDS
virus, before awarding damages. 7 7 This court also misunderstood that the
crux of the claim was the fear of getting HIV, and not the injury of
contracting HIV.'
Such recovery, based on fear of AIDS and not on
physical injury, was eventually permitted in two state cases, Faya v.
30
Almarez179 and Carrollv. Sisters of St. FrancisHealth Services.

'73See Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14,23 (N.J. 1997) (stating the window of anxiety
is six months to one year).
174See Ferrera v. Galluchio, 152 N.E.2d 249 (N.Y. 1958) (allowing recovery based upon the
fear of developing cancer).

7'SSee id.

17 ,TransAmerica Ins. Co. v. Doe, 840 P.2d 288 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
'771d. ar 29 1.
1781d.
179Faya v. Almarez, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. Ct. App. 1993).
'Carroll v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Serv. Inc., 868 S.W.2d 585 (Tenn. 1993).
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Since 1993, only two states have allowed recovery for AIDS phobia
claims, using a general reasonableness standard to determine whether the
claim was legitimate. These decisions have been the most logically
consistent to date. The two cases are Favav. Almare-z' l in Maryland and
Williamson v. Waldman 82 in New Jersey. However, Carrollv. Sisters of
St. Francis Health Services 183in Tennessee and Doe v. Surgicare of
Joliet1" in Illinois, while using an actual exposure standard, still
recognized that a latency period existed and allowed recovery for this
minimal time period.
In Faya v. Almarez, plaintiff was operated on by the defendant
physician, who knew he had the AIDS virus.'
The plaintiff became
aware ofthe physician's AIDS condition through anewspaper article more
than one year after surgery.186 The court stated in order to sustain a claim,
the plaintiff had to demonstrate the physician breached a duty of care and
the breach proximately caused a legally cognizable injury."bl The court
allowed the plaintiff to recover limited damages for mental anguish.1c"
The plaintiff could only "[r]ecover for the fear of and its physical
manifestations which may have resulted from Almarez' [the physician]
alleged negligence for the period constituting their reasonable window of
anxiety-the period between which they
learned of Almarez' illness and
18 9
received their IRV-negative results."
In essence, the court had two choices in this case; it could deny
recovery based upon the fact that the window of anxiety (a six to twelve
month period) had expired, or it could permit recovery. It chose to do the
latter. It appears the court basically adopted a modified version ofmedical
malpractice recovery, which allows for recovery from the time of
discovery. Such a theory was appropriate in this case, because discovery
was ultimately impossible at an earlier date. The court essentially
expanded upon Lubowitz and arrived at a fair and logical result.

.1 Faya, 620 A.2d at 327.
1

Willianson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14 (N.J. 1997).
"'Carroll,868 SAV.2d at 585.
'"Doe v. Surgicare of Joliet, Inc, 643 N.E.2d 1200 (111. App. CL 1994).
'sFaya v. Almarez, 620 A.D.2d at 327 (Md. Ct. App. 1993).

1851d.

"71d. at 333.
lrsId

I91d. at 337.
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In Carroll .v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Services, plaintiff
accidentally placed her hand into a container holding contaminated
needles. 190 In denying plaintiff's claim for damages, the court stated no
proof existed that the plaintiff had been exposed to the HIV virus because
she could not prove exposure to the disease at any time.' 91 Additionally,
plaintifftested negative for HIV five times over a three year period. 9 ' The
court chose to reject the general reasonableness standard adopted by Faya.
Instead, the court required actual exposure to the disease in order to
establish aprimafaciecase for emotional damages.193 However, the court
allowed damages for emotional distress assuming "[a]ny damages for
emotional distress were confined to the time between discovery of the
[exposure] and the negative medical diagnosis or other information that
puts to rest the fear of injury."' 94 While the court chose to adopt the actual
exposure analysis, it did recognize that recovery should be allowed for the
relevant latency period or the time in which the "ordinary, reasonable
person under the circumstances" experiences fear.' 95 While this court did
not expand upon the definition of a "reasonable person," several years
later in Williamson96v. Waldman, the New Jersey Supreme Court carefully
defined this term.
In Doe v. Surgicare of Joliet, plaintiff was stuck with an unsterile
needle by a medical technician during the course of surgery; however, she
was not informed of this until approximately two months after the surgery
occurred. 9 7 The physician refused to identify the technician and the
technician refused to undergo HIV testing.' 98 The court recognized that
ninety-nine percent of HIV cases are detected within six months of
exposure, but refused to allow plaintiff to recover for those six months.'99
The court, in applying the actual exposure standard, stated because there
was no proof the plaintiff had been exposed to the HIV virus, recovery
would not be permitted.200 The dissent pointed out the inconsistency in
'Carroll v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Serv. Inc., 868 S.W.2d 585, 586 (Tenn. 1993).
'9'id.at 590.

19id.

193Id.at 591.
"41d. at 594.
t..Carroll v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Serv. Inc., 868 S.W.2d 585, 594 (Tenn. 1993).
"..SeeWilliamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14, 18 (N.J. 1997).
9'Doe v. Surgicare of Joliet, 643 N.E.2d 1200, 1200-01 (Iil. App. Ct. 1994).
198Id.
2'99d.at

00Id.

1201.
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using the actual exposure standard in this case. Justice Barry stated "[lt]hat
this logic (requiring actual exposure) is flawed when applied to cases in
which the defendant's actions have made it impossible for the plaintiff to
prove actual exposure."' Again, it seems that this case exemplifies a
situation where the plaintiff should have been allowed to recover for
damages incurred during the time frame she was uncertain as to her HIV
status. In other words, the recovery period should have begun at the time
of discovery of possible infection.
In Barrett v. Danbury Hospital,plaintiff was seated on a stretcher
which had blood on the surface."' 2 The physician noticed the existence of
the blood, but thought the blood was from the plaintiff20 3 The physician
eventually discovered the source of the blood was not the plaintiff.2 '
Plaintiff then brought suit claiming he might have been exposed to HIV
contaminated blood and therefore, was fearful of contracting HIV. - The
trial court adopted the actual exposure standard. 2'5 Based on this standard,
the court concluded no proof existed showing the plaintiff had ever been
exposed to the HIV/AIDS virus. 7 The court stated, "[the] [flear is
unreasonable in view of the facts and evidence presented to this court,
because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he actually had been
exposed to any disease causing agent.... . 203 The plaintiffurged the court
to adopt the Montineri standard.20 9 Under this standard, a plaintiff may
recover if the defendant should have realized his conduct involved an
unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress and the distress might
cause bodily harm.210 In affirming the trial court, the appellate court stated
that regardless of whether the actual exposure standard or the Montineri
applied, plaintiff had not established a case for emotional
standard2 was
1
distress. '
This case differs from previous AIDS phobia cases because no
foreign blood entered the body. However, if even the smallest chance
201

id. at 1204.
" Barrett v. Danbury Hosp., 654 A.2d 748, 749 (Conn. 1995).
2
Id.
2 2

714 Id.
miId. at 750.
2

06Id. at 751.
"'TBarrett v. Danbury Hosp., 654 A.2d 748, 751 (Conn. 1995).

203Id.

2Id.at 756.
2

(citing Montinieri
2"id.
1
1d.

v. Southern New England Tel. Co., 393 A.2d 1180 (Conn. 1973).
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existed that the blood did enter the body, plaintiff should be permitted to
recover for the requisite latency period under the general reasonableness
theory, until the fear is alleviated through appropriate testing during the
latency period.
In Chizmar v. Mackie, the defendant misdiagnosed plaintiff, stating
she had AIDS, when in fact, she was HIV negative.2 12 The superior court
determined plaintiff had not sustained physical injury and therefore, was
13
unable to recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
The Supreme Court of Alaska reversed, stating that a physical injury was
not required to recover damages.214 While damages are not traditionally
awarded in the absence of a physical injury, exceptions to this rule exist
when the claim is neither false nor insubstantial.2" 5
The Chizmar court adopted the reasoning of Molien v. Kaiser
Foundation Hospital.216 In Molien, the Supreme Court of California
allowed a husband to recover when a physician negligently misdiagnosed
his wife with syphilis. 2 7 The Molien court recognized "emotional injury
may be as debilitating as physical harm, it is no less deserving of
redress." 21 8 Based on this analysis, as well as the duty owed by the
physician to refrain from activity which presented a foreseeable and
unreasonable risk of causing emotional harm, redress was not allowed in
the Chizmarcase. Under this analysis, recovery would also not have been
allowed in New York. In Lubowitz, plaintiff was also misdiagnosed as
having tested false-positive.21 9 Recovery in that case was denied,
although
220
case.
that
in
duty
physician's
the
the court failed to address
In 1997, Williamson v. Waldman was decided by the New Jersey
Supreme Court. 22' The case had a similar fact pattern as the New York
Castro case.222 In Williamson, the New Jersey Supreme Court allowed a
cleaning woman who was pricked with a lancet (a surgical object used to
acquire blood samples) to recover damages based upon negligent infliction
2 2

' Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 198 (Alaska 1995).

213

1d.
2141d.
215

1d.

216
Molien
217

v. Kaiser Found., 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980).
1d. at 814.
218
1d.
21
Lubowitz v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 623 A.2d 3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
2Old.
1
2" Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14 (N.J. 1997).
'See Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
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of emotional distress. 223 The woman saw her physician on June 10, 1991,
four days after the incident. 4 Her physician informed her that she needed
to be tested for HIV for the next seven to ten years.
In 1994, after
undergoing several tests, all of which were negative, her physician6
modified the testing time to a year or two, which had already passed'
The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants because the
plaintiff had not demonstrated actual exposure to HIV.rn However, the
Appellate Court reversed and remanded the decision back to the trial court
with an instruction that actual exposure need not be shown, and that
recovery could be based upon a reasonable fear, which was a question for
the jury. 22 The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate
Court's decision, and stated "[e]motional distress damages must be based
on the fears experienced by a reasonable and well-informed person and
should be limited to the 'window of anxiety."' ' 9 The court stated the
"window of anxiety" was between six months and one year, and the fact
the plaintiff's own physician had given her inaccurate information did not
extend the window beyond the one year time frame.230 This was the first
time the New Jersey Supreme Court had ever given a "window of anxiety"
any consideration.
The court also carefully examined what constituted a "reasonable and
well-informed person." Before bringing a claim for emotional distress
damages based on the fear of contracting HIV, the court held an individual
must avail himself of all information pertaining to the disease available to
the general public.2' The court placed a burden upon an individual to
educate himself about the nature of HIV, and to contact another physician
if the individual had any question as to what an appropriate treatment plan
should be. 32 Specifically, the court defined a reasonable person as one
"[o]f ordinary experience who has a level of knowledge that coincides

223

Williamson, 696 A.2d at 22.

4
22
Id.

=Id
Villiamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14, 17 (N.L 1997).
227Id. at

14.

=Id
2-Id
23Id.
23Id. at 22.
' 2Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14,22 (NJ. 1997).
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with then-current, accurate, and generally available public information
about the causes and transmission of AIDS. 233
The New Jersey Supreme Court synthesized previous decisions and
devised a fair and equitable means of recovery. Requiring individuals to
be educated about the nature of their injuries before bringing a claim may
be a burden to some, but this requirement is logical and legitimate, and
certainly avoids having unnecessary law suits brought before the courts.
This serious matter deserves more research than what currently exists. As
a result of this decision, New Jersey adopted what the New Jersey
Supreme Court dubbed the "enhanced reasonableness standard" and thus,
joined Maryland in acknowledging the minority viewpoint.234 This was
the first time that the New Jersey courts had sustained such a claim.
A majority and minority standard have emerged in the United States
for allowing recovery based upon AIDS phobia. The majority standard,
embraced by New York, requires actual exposure to HIV in order to
recover.2 35 These states require genuineness and actual exposure, and look
to the mode oftransmission. 236 With respect to the mode oftransmission,
transmission by means of a hypodermic needle is the most likely claim to
be sustained because genuineness is never a problem. There is always a
specific incident, namely the prick of the needle.237 Cases involving
surgical procedures are also likely to be sustained. In these cases, there is
a bodily intrusion and blood is exposed. Again, genuineness is rarely a
problem.238
The minority viewpoint, adopted by Maryland and New Jersey, is
based upon a general reasonableness standard.2 39 These two states have
allowed recovery for AIDS phobia in the absence of an actual injury, and
have recognized claims brought based on fear. Pursuant to this standard,
there must be genuineness: a reasonable belief the individual has been
exposed to HIV and has the virus. Thus, the mode of transmission is
relevant. The states operating under the general reasonableness standard
have been more lenient in allowing plaintiffs to recover from the date of

"3Williamson, 696 A.2d at 22.
2"See id. at 24.
"See supra pp. 545-58.
236See suprapp. 545-58.
2
" See Carroll v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Serv. Inc., 868 S.W.2d 585, (Tenn. 1993).
"'Doe v. Surgicare of Joliet, Inc., 643 N.E.2d 1200 (II1.App. Ct. 1994).
gSee supra p.562-65.
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discovery, provided the window period has not expired. 40 Several actual
exposure states, including New York, have recognized the existence ofthe
window period, but have not allowed recovery based upon this window.
Under the general reasonableness standard, if an individual has a
reasonable belief he has been infected with BIV, and is tested on a
continuous basis during the window period, he may recover for the time
period in which he reasonably experienced mental anguish. 4 '
Both the majority and minority standards have recognized a window
period. However, the majority states have refused to apply the
information in a logical and consistent manner. The majority opinion
contradicts itselfby identifying the information, but refusing to apply it to
allow for recovery. The minority viewpoint becomes the better standard
for two reasons. First, the minority viewpoint allows the latency period
to be applied in a normal and natural manner. Second, the minority
viewpoint acknowledges the claim is being brought for fear of the disease,
and not the actual contraction of the disease. Hopefully, over the course
of the next few years, the general reasonableness standard will become the
majority viewpoint in the United States.

CONCLUSION
Negligent infliction of emotional distress has gone through a major
transformation over the last few decades. Recent cases have shown that
recovery has become more prevalent. While New York may make
recovery a bit more difficult than other states such as California, which
allows recovery based on foreseeability, if an individual has legitimately
been exposed to IV, it is likely a claim will at least be sustained.
However, damages may not always be awarded.
There are some changes which must be made in regard to recovering
for AIDS phobia. First, courts must recognize the claim is being brought
for the fear of contracting the disease, and not actual contraction. The
actual exposure standard, which is the majority standard in this country,
fails to recognize this difference. Only two minority states, Maryland and
New Jersey, have recognized the fear element, and have adopted a general
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reasonableness standard. This is much more logical in that it recognizes
what has occurred, not what may occur in the future.
Second, it is imperative that attorneys do both extensive legal and
medical research. Attorneys must know what a claim for AIDS phobia
entails, and must inform the court of these details. Tests for HIV are
constantly being updated and advanced, and attorneys must be aware of
these changes. While several courts have acknowledged the six to twelve
month latency period, every attorney and every court in 1999 should be
aware of this time period. AIDS has been in existence for more than a
decade and extensive research has been done during this time. Courts
should be made aware of this when redressing these claims.
Third, courts should recognize in some cases, these claims are
nothing more than medical malpractice claims and should be treated as
such. This is especially true in misdiagnosis cases. Were the
misdiagnosis claims brought under medical malpractice law, the statute of
limitations would begin at the time of discovery. This should be true in
AIDS phobia cases as well. Plaintiffs should be able to recover damages
for the time period in which the individual discovers he may have been
exposed to HIV. When aperson legitimately suffers mental anguish, some
sort of redress should be available.
AIDS phobia claims are not disappearing. Only individuals who have
suffered through the period of not knowing whether they have been
infected with HIV can understand the depths of their anguish. The courts
should recognize this anguish by allowing for recovery during the latency
period, in which no person can truly say whether an individual has in fact
been infected with the HIV virus.

